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Abstract
The concept of Owen point, introduced in Guardiola et al. (2009), is
an appealing solution concept that for Production-Inventory games (PI-
games) always belongs to their core. The Owen point allows all the players
in the game to operate at minimum cost but it does not take into account
the cost reduction induced by essential players over their followers (fans).
Thus, it may be seen as an altruistic allocation for essential players what
can be criticized. The aim this paper is two-fold: to study the struc-
ture and complexity of the core of PI-games and to introduce new core
allocations for PI-games improving the weaknesses of the Owen point.
Regarding the first goal, we advance further on the analysis of PI-games
and we analyze its core structure and algorithmic complexity. Specifically,
we prove that the number of extreme points of the core of PI-games is
exponential on the number of players. On the other hand, we propose and
characterize a new core-allocation, the Omega point, which compensates
the essential players for their role on reducing the costs of their fans. More-
over, we define another solution concept, the Quid Pro Quo set (QPQ-set)
of allocations, which is based on the Owen and Omega points. Among all
the allocations in this set, we emphasize what we call the Solomonic QPQ
allocation and we provide some necessary conditions for the coincidence
of that allocation with the Shapley value and the Nucleolus.
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1 Introduction
Guardiola et al. (2009) introduced Production-Inventory games (henceforth PI-
games) as a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games.
That paper proposed the so-called Owen point core-allocation that allows all
players to operate at minimum cost at the price of not compensating essen-
tial users by the cost reduction that they induce over the remaining players
(fans). This allocation has proven to be rather appealing and in another pa-
per, Guardiola et al. (2008) analyze its properties and propose three axiomatic
characterizations for the Owen point. These papers also contribute to a better
knowledge of the core of PI-games. Nevertheless, it was missing a deeper anal-
ysis of its complexity. Specifically speaking the two following aspects were not
considered: testing core membership and the extreme points structure of the
core of these games. Complexity issues in cooperative game theory raise impor-
tant questions only partially answered for particular classes of games. The core
of any convex game is the convex hull of its marginal vectors (Shapley 1971),
and the same property holds true for those games satisfying the Co-Ma property
which include, among others, assignment and information games, see Hamers
et al. (2002) and Kuipers (1993) respectively. It is also well-known that the
core of assignment games coincide with the allocations induced by dual solu-
tions and it is a complete lattice with only two extreme points, see Sotomayor
(2003). Also, for transportation games, which constitute an extension of the
assignment games, some results about the relationship between the core and
the allocations induced by dual solutions are provided by Sa´nchez-Soriano et
al. (2001). Moreover, Perea et al. (2012) study cooperation situations in linear
production problems. In particular, that paper proposes a new solution concept
called EOwen set as an improvement of the Owen set that contains at least one
allocation that assigns a strictly positive payoff to players necessary for optimal
production plans.
For minimum cost spanning tree games, flow games, linear production games,
cooperative facility location games or min-coloring games among others, test-
ing whether a given allocation is in the core is an NP-complete problem (see
Faigle et al. (1997), Fang et al. (2002), Goemans and Skutella (2004) and
Deng et al. (1999), respectively). On the other hand, there are some classes of
games for which testing core membership is polynomially solvable as for instance
for routing games, see Derks and Kuipers (1997), s − t connectivity games, r-
arborescence games, max matching games, min vertex cover games, min edge
cover games or max independent set games, see e.g., Deng et al. (1999). How-
ever, for many other classes of cooperative games answering that question is
still open, as it is the case of PI-games.
In this paper we investigate the structure of the core of PI-games by de-
termining its algorithmic complexity. Our contribution is to prove that testing
core membership is an NP-complete problem and moreover that the number of
extreme points of the core of PI-games is exponential on the number of players.
Specifically, we characterize an exponential size subset of them. In addition,
we look for alternative cost allocations improving the fairness properties of the
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Owen point in that they recognize the role of the essential players on reducing
the costs of the remaining players.
To present our results the rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start
by introducing some preliminary concepts in section 2. In section 3 we prove
that testing core membership of PI-games in an NP-complete problem, and we
analyze the core structure of PI-games. We define what we call the extreme
functions, which help us to prove that the core of a PI-game, in general, has
an exponential number of extreme points. In section 4 we introduce a new
core-allocation for PI-games, the Omega point, and provide an axiomatic char-
acterization. Finally, in section 5 we define the set of Quid Pro Quo allocations
(henceforth, QPQ allocations). Every QPQ allocation is a convex combination
of the Owen and the Omega point. We focus then on the equally weighted QPQ
allocation, the Solomonic allocation, and we provide some necessary conditions
for the coincidence of the latter with the Shapley value and the Nucleolus.
2 Preliminaries
A cost game with transferable utility (henceforth TU cost game) is a pair (N, c),
where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the finite set of players, and the characteristic function
c : P(N) → R, is defined over P(N) the set of nonempty coalitions of N . By
agreement, it always satisfies c(∅) = 0. For all S ⊆ N , we denote by |S| the
cardinal of the set S.
A distribution of the costs of the grand coalition, usually called cost-sharing
vector, is a vector x ∈ RN . For every coalition S ⊆ N we denote by xS :=∑
i∈S xi the cost-sharing of coalition S (where x∅ = 0). The core of a TU cost
game consists of those cost-sharing vectors x which allocate the cost of the grand
coalition N in such a way that no coalition S has incentives to leave N because
x(S) is smaller than the original cost of S, c(S). Formally, the core of (N, c)
is given by Core(N, c) = {x ∈ Rn /xN = c(N) and xS ≤ c(S) for all S ⊂ N } .
In the following, core-allocations will be cost-sharing vectors belonging to the
core. A cost game (N, c) is balanced if and only if has a nonempty core (see
Bondareva 1963 or Shapley 1967). Shapley and Shubik (1969) describe totally
balanced games as those games whose subgames are also balanced; i.e., the core
of every subgame is nonempty. A cost game (N, c) is concave if for all i ∈ N
and all S, T ⊆ N such that S ⊆ T ⊂ N with i ∈ S, then c(S) − c(S \ {i}) ≥
c(T )− c(T \ {i}).
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is a linear function on the class of all TU
games and for a cost game (N, c) it is defined as φ(N, c) = (φi(N, c))i∈N where
for all i ∈ N
φi(N, c) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
· [c(S ∪ {i})− c(S)] .
The Nucleolus η(N, c) (Schmeidler, 1969) is the allocation that lexicograph-
ically minimizes the vector of excesses. It is well-known that the Nucleolus is a
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core-allocation provided that the core is nonempty.
Let Q be a bounded convex polyhedron in Rn. We say that x ∈ Q is an
extreme point if y, z ∈ Q and x = 12y +
1
2z imply y = z. From now on, we
denote, respectively, by Ext (Q) and by ∂ (Q) the set of extreme points and the
boundary of the set of Q. Moreover, for the sake of readability, we use ei to
refer to the i-th element of the canonical basis of Rn and val(P ) stands for the
optimal value of the mathematical programming problem P .
It is well-known that x ∈ Ext (Q) if and only if x satisfies as equalities at
least n linearly independent constraints of those defining Q. Since the core is a
bounded convex polyhedron, it has a finite number of extreme points. Moreover,
the core is a convex set. Therefore, characterizing the extreme core-allocations
is important to know its intrinsic structure.
From now on, and for the sake of readability, we follow the same notation as
Guardiola et al. (2009) to describe Production-Inventory situations (henceforth:
PI-situations) and PI-games. Consider first a situation with several agents facing
each one a Production-Inventory problem. Then, they decide to cooperate to
reduce costs. Here the cooperation is considered as sharing technologies in
production, inventory carrying and backlogged demand. We mean that if a
group of agents agree on cooperation then at each period they will produce and
pay inventory carrying and backlogged demand at the cheapest costs among the
members of the coalition. This situation is called a PI-situation.
Formally, let U be an infinite set, the universe of players. A PI-situation
is a 3-tuple (N,D,ℜ) where N ⊂ U is a finite set of players (|N | = n) and D
an integer matrix of demands with D = [d1, . . . , dn]′, di = [di1, . . . , d
i
T ] ≥ 0,
dit is the demand of the player i during period t ∈ T and T is the planning
horizon. In addition, ℜ = (H |B|P ) is a cost matrix, so that H = [h1, . . . , hn]′,
B = [b1, . . . , bn]′ and P = [p1, . . . , pn]′; where hi = [hi1, . . . , h
i
T ] ≥ 0, h
i
t is the
unit inventory carrying costs of the player i in period t, bi = [bi1, . . . , b
i
T ] ≥
0, bit is the unit backlogging carrying costs of the player i in period t, and
pi = [pi1, . . . , p
i
T ] ≥ 0, p
i
t the unit production costs of the player i in period t,
for t = 1, . . . , T . The decision variables of the model, which are required to be
integer quantities, are the production during period t (qt), the inventory at hand
at the end of period t (It), and the backlogged demand at the end of period t
(Et). We denote by Υ the set of PI-situations (N,D,ℜ) defined over U , being
n ≥ 1, T ≥ 1 and D an integer matrix.
Now given a PI-situation (N,D,ℜ), we can associate the corresponding TU
cost game (N, c) with the following characteristic function c: c(∅) = 0 and for
any S ⊆ N, c(S) = val(PI(S)), where PI(S) is given by
(PI(S)) min
T∑
t=1
(pSt qt + h
S
t It + b
S
t Et)
s.t. I0 = IT = E0 = ET = 0,
It − Et = It−1 − Et−1 + qt − d
S
t , t = 1, . . . , T,
qt, It, Et, non-negative, integer, t = 1, . . . , T ;
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with
pSt = min
i∈S
{pit}, h
S
t = min
i∈S
{hit}, b
S
t = min
i∈S
{bit}, d
S
t =
∑
i∈S
dit.
Every TU cost game defined as above is called a Production-Inventory game.
Guardiola et al. (2009) points out that the problem PI(S) has integer optimal
solutions provided that the demands are integer. We know that the dual problem
of PI(S), for any coalition S ⊆ N , is the following mathematical programming
problem,
(DLPI(S)) max
T∑
t=1
dSt yt
s.t. yt ≤ p
S
t , t = 1, . . . , T,
yt+1 − yt ≤ h
S
t , t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
−yt+1 + yt ≤ b
S
t , t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Moreover, Guardiola et al. (2009) also proves that an optimal solution of
problem DLPI(S) is y∗t (S) = min
{
pSt ,mink<t{p
S
k + h
S
kt},mink>t{p
S
k + b
S
tk}
}
,
for all t = 1, . . . , T, with
pSk =
{
pS1 if k < 1,
pST if k > T,
hSkt =
t−1∑
r=k
hSr , for any k < t, t = 2, . . . , T ;h
S
k1 = 0, k < 1,
bStk =
k−1∑
r=t
bSr , for any k > t, t = 1, . . . , T − 1; b
S
Tk = 0, k > T.
It is important to note that those optimal solutions satisfy a monotonicity
property with respect to coalitions : y∗t (S) ≥ y
∗
t (R) for all S ⊆ R ⊆ N and
all t ∈ {1, ..., T }. Moreover, the characteristic function of PI-games can be
rewritten as follows: for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, c(S) =
∑T
t=1 d
S
t y
∗
t (S).
PI-games are not concave in general as shown by Example 4.4 in Guardiola
et al. (2009). The allocation
(∑T
t=1 d
i
ty
∗
t (N)
)
i∈N
= Dy∗(N) is called the Owen
point, and it is denoted by Owen(N,D,ℜ). At times, for the sake of simplicity,
we use o to refer to the Owen point. That same paper also proves that the Owen
point is a core-allocation which can be reached through a PMAS (Sprumont,
1990); hence every PI-game is a totally balanced game. In some situations we
will use c(N,D,ℜ)(S) instead of c(S), in order to denote that the game (N, c)
comes from the situation (N,D,ℜ).
We say that a player i ∈ N is essential if there exists t ∈ {1, ..., T } with
d
N\{i}
t > 0 such that y
∗
t (N\{i}) > y
∗
t (N). An essential player is the one for
which there exists at least one period in which he is needed by the rest of players
in order to produce a certain demand at a minimum cost. The set of essential
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players is denoted by E . Those players not being essential are called inessential.
We can easily check that for each inessential player i, oN\{i} = c(N \ {i}).
Guardiola et al. (2009) showed that the core of PI-games shrinks to a single
point, the Owen point, just only when all players are inessential for the PI-
situation.
Finally, to conclude this section devoted to preliminaries, we recall the class
of PS-games introduced by Kar et al. (2009). A PS-game (N, c) is a TU cost
game satisfying that for all player i ∈ N, there exists a real constant ci such
that ∆i(S) + ∆i(N \ (S ∪ {i}) = ci for all S ⊆ N \ {i}, where ∆i(S) :=
c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S). The above mentioned paper proves that, for this class of
games, the Shapley value and the Nucleolus coincide; i.e. φ(N, c) = η(N, c).
3 Extreme points of the core of PI-games
Guardiola et al. (2009) demostrated that the core of PI-games without essential
players (E = ∅) shrinks to a singleton, the Owen point. However, for those PI-
games with essential players (E 6= ∅), the core is large. We focus here on
those PI-games with large cores and study the structure of its core by analyzing
its extreme points. First of all, we remark that testing core membership for
PI-games cannot be done in polynomial time. One can adapt the reduction
proposed in Fang et al. (2002) to prove that checking if an imputation belongs
to the core of a PI-game is an NP-complete decision problem. In spite of that, it
is important to know the structure of the core and still very little is known about
the extreme points complexity of PI-games. This is the goal of this section.
We begin this analysis by defining the essential player fan set.
Let (N,D,ℜ) be a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix ((N,D,ℜ) ∈
Υ), and let i be an essential player. We define the fan set of i as follows:
Fi := {j ∈ N\{i}
∣∣∣∃t ∈ {1, ..., T } with djt > 0 and y∗t (N\{i}) > y∗t (N)}.
The fan set of player i consists of all players who need him to operate at a
lower cost. It is always a non-empty set. Indeed, Fi 6= ∅ since taking i ∈ E ,
there exists t∗ ∈ {1, ..., T } such that y∗t∗(N\{i}) > y
∗
t∗(N) and d
N\{i}
t∗ > 0. In
that case, there must be, at least, a player j ∈ N\{i} such that djt∗ > 0 and
y∗t∗(N\{i}) > y
∗
t∗(N) .
In addition, you may notice that there is a pairwise relationship among
essential players and their fans, in the sense that the latter are interested in
taking on a portion of the costs of the former. This relationship allows us to
introduce the concept of essential-fan pair.
Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ. The essential-fan pair set, denoted by P, is:
P := {(i, j)|i ∈ E and j ∈ Fi}.
We are now interested in determining the cost that can be transferred within
every essential-fan pair with a cost allocation; i.e., the maximum portion of the
essential player cost that his fan could assume while maintaining cooperation.
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Given a essential-fan pair p = (i, j) ∈ P and a allocation x ∈ Rn, the
transferred cost induced by p regarding x is:
αp(x) := min
R∈∆p
{c(R)− xR},
where
∆(i,j) := {R ⊆ N\{i} such that j ∈ R}.
αp(x) can be interpreted as the maximum portion of cost of player i that
can be awarded by player j while maintaining the cooperation of the group. It
is worth nothing that if x ∈ Core(N, c) then αp(x) ≥ 0.
Next result states that there are always a positive transferred cost within
every essential-fan pair with the Owen point.
Lemma 3.1 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the corresponding PI-game. Then
αp(o) > 0 for all p ∈ P.
Proof. As E 6= ∅, we can take i ∈ E and therefore Fi 6= ∅. Let R ⊆
N \ {i} such that R ∩ Fi 6= ∅ and let j ∈ R ∩ Fi. By definition, there exists
t∗ ∈ {1, ..., T } such that y∗t∗(N\{i}) > y
∗
t∗(N) and d
j
t∗ > 0. Then d
R
t∗ > 0 and
moreover y∗t∗(N) < y
∗
t∗(N\{i}) ≤ y
∗
t∗(R). Thus, oR < c(R). Hence, αp(o) =
minR∈∆p{c(R)− oR} > 0.
We introduce now a function that transforms any cost allocation into a new
cost allocation in which a fan player charges with the maximum cost of his
essential player. That is, for each p = (i, j) ∈ P, the function fp transforms
any allocation x into a new allocation fp(x), in which the fan player j assumes
as much cost as possible from his essential player i. It is called the extreme
function.
Definition 3.2 (extreme function) Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the cor-
responding PI-game. For any p = (i, j) ∈ P, the extreme function fp is defined
by:
fp(x) = x+ ∧p(x),
where x ∈ Rn and ∧p(x) = ej · αp(x)− ei · αp(x).
Let us denote by P|P| the |P|-fold cartesian product of the set P. We consider
now the composition of extreme functions. For each σ ∈ P|P| we define the
extreme composite function, Fσ, as the composition of extreme functions for all
the pairs in σ, that is,
Fσ(x) :=
(
fσ|P| ◦ fσ|P|−1 ◦ ... ◦ fσ1
)
(x) .
Notice that if σ = (p, p, ..., p) ∈ P|P| then Fσ(x) = fp(x).
Example 3.3 The following table shows a PI-situation with three periods and
three players:
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Demand Production Inventory Backlogging
P1 10 10 5 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
P2 8 12 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
P3 6 5 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2
We can easily check that c(S) =
3∑
t=1
pSt d
S
t , for all S ⊆ N . Hence, the
characteristic function of the corresponding PI-game is given in the following
table:
dS1 d
S
2 d
S
3 p
S
1 p
S
2 p
S
3 h
S
1 h
S
2 b
S
1 b
S
2 c
{1} 10 10 5 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 35
{2} 8 12 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 36
{3} 6 5 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 25
{1, 2} 18 22 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 51
{1, 3} 16 15 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 38
{2, 3} 14 17 8 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 53
{1, 2, 3} 24 27 13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 64
In this example, y∗(N) = (1, 1, 1) and y∗(N \ {1}) = (2, 1, 1) are the optimal
solution for (DLPB(N)) and (DLPB(N \ {1})) , respectively. Then, the Owen
point is o = (25, 26, 13). Moreover, E = {1}, F1 = {2, 3} and P = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}.
The transferred cost within every essential-fan pair in P with the Owen point
are,
α(1,2)(o) = min
R∈∆(1,2)
{c(R)− oR} = 10,
α(1,3)(o) = min
R∈∆(1,3)
{c(R)− oR} = 12.
Therefore, the extreme functions are
f(1,2)(o) = o+ ∧(1,2)(o) = (15, 36, 13),
f(1,3)(o) = o+ ∧(1,3)(o) = (13, 26, 25).
In this case, both the extreme functions, f(1,2)(o), f(1,3)(o), and the Owen
point, o, are extreme points of the core.
The previous example shows that the Owen point is an extreme point of the
core, and that the extreme functions transform it into other extreme points of
the core. We wonder then if this fact occurs in general for any PI-game. First,
we find a very interesting property that relates the extreme functions to the
core boundary.
Proposition 3.4 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the corresponding PI-game.
For all p ∈ P
fp(Core(N, c)) ⊆ ∂(Core(N, c)).
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Proof. Let p = (i, j) ∈ P and take x ∈ Core(N, c). Then αp(x) ≥ 0.
Applying the extreme function fp at x, we have:
fp(x) = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi − αp(x), xi+1, ..., xj−1, xj + αp(x), xj+1 , ..., xn).
To prove that y := fp(x) ∈ Core(N, c) we distinguish four possibilities:
• i, j ∈ S. Then yS = xS + αp(x)− αp(x) = xS ≤ c(S).
• i, j /∈ S. Then yS = xS ≤ c(S).
• i /∈ S, j ∈ S. Then yS = xS + αp(x) ≤ xS + c(S)− xS = c(S).
• i ∈ S, j /∈ S. Then yS = xS − αp(x) ≤ xS ≤ c(S).
Hence, y ∈ Core(N, c) since yS ≤ c(S) for any coalition S ⊆ N . Let us
proof now that y belongs to the frontier of the core.
If αp(x) = 0 then there exists R ∈ ∆p such that c(R) = xR. Since y belongs
to the core and satisfies as equality one of the constraints defining the core, we
can conclude that y ∈ ∂(Core(N, c)).
If αp(x) > 0 then for all λ ∈ (0, 1), (1−λ)x+λy ∈ Core(N, c). Take λ = 1+ǫ
with ǫ > 0 to have
(1− λ)x + λy = −ǫx+ (1 + ǫ)(x+ ∧p(x)) = x+ (1 + ǫ) ∧p (x).
We can check that ifR∗ ∈ ∆p is such that c(R
∗)−xR∗ = minR∈∆p{c(R)−xR}
then xR∗ + αp(x) = c(R
∗), therefore x + (1 + ǫ) ∧p (x) /∈ Core(N, c). Hence, y
is not an interior point.
It follows straightforward from the above proposition, that Fσ(Core(N, c)) ⊆
∂(Core (N, c)) for all σ ∈ P|P|.
The main Theorem of this Section provides a partial answer to our previous
question about the transformation of the Owen point into extreme points of the
core of PI-games. It states that for PI-situations with a single essential player,
all the different compositions of extreme functions over the Owen point generate
extreme points of the core.
Theorem 3.5 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the corresponding PI-game. If
E = {i}, then Fσ(o) ∈ Ext (Core(N, c)) for all σ ∈ P
|P|.
Proof. Let j ∈ Fi then the pair pj = (i, j) ∈ P. fpj (o) is an extreme point
if for any y, z ∈ Core (N, c) such that
fpj (o) =
1
2
y +
1
2
z we have that y = z. (1)
By definition, we know that
fpj (o) = (o1, ..., oi−1, oi − αpj (o), oi+1, ..., oj−1, oj + αpj (o), oj+1, ..., on).
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Let us suppose that zk < ok for any k 6= i, j then zN\{k} > oN\{k} =
c (N \ {k}) . However this is not possible, therefore yk, zk ≥ ok for all k 6= i, j.
Now, apply (1) to get that yk = zk = ok ∀k 6= i, j. Moreover, yj , zj ≤ oj+αpj(o)
since αpj (o) > 0 is the maximum possible increment for oj (see Lemma 3.1).
Then by (1) we have that z = y and hence fpj (o) ∈ Ext (Core(N, c)).
Now, we consider pl = (i, l) ∈ P, and apply the corresponding extreme
function for this pair. We have that
fpl
(
fpj (o)
)
= (o1, ..., oi−αpj (o)−αpl(fpj (o)), ..., ol+αpl(fpj (o)), ..., oj+αpj (o), ..., on).
We distinguish two possibilities:
1. αpj (o) attains its minimum in a coalition R
∗ that contains player l. In
this case αpl(fpj (o)) = 0, thus fpl
(
fpj (o)
)
= fpj (o) and by the argument
above fpl
(
fpj (o)
)
is an extreme point of Core(N, c).
2. αpj (o) attains its minimum in a coalition R
∗ that does not contain player
l. This case implies that αpl(fpj (o)) > 0. Take y, z ∈ Core(N, c) and
assume that
fpl
(
fpj (o)
)
=
1
2
y +
1
2
z. (2)
Using the same argument as above we conclude that yk = zk = ok for
all k 6= i, j, l. Consider now the j-th coordinate. Suppose that zj > oj +
αpj (o). The coalition R
∗ does not contain neither i nor l, which implies
c(R∗) = oR∗ + αpj (o) < zR∗ . Since this is a contradiction, it means that
zj ≤ oj + αpj (o) (Notice that the same argument applies to yj and thus
yj ≤ oj + αpj (o)). Therefore, by (2) we get that yj = zj = oj + αpj (o).
Next, consider the l-th coordinate. Assume that zl > ol+αpl(fpj (o)), and
let S∗ be the coalition where αpl(fpj (o)) attains its minimum, then c(S) =∑
k∈S
(
fpj (o)
)
k
+ αpl(fpj (o)) < zS . Again using the same argument as in
the j-th coordinate we conclude that yl = zl = ol + αpl(fpj (o)).
Finally, we get the same conclusion for the i-th coordinate since fpl
(
fpj (o)
)
must be efficient. In conclusion z = y.Hence, fpl
(
fpj (o)
)
∈ Ext (Core(N, c)).
Notice that fpl
(
fpj (o)
)
is different from fpj (o) since we have assumed that
αpl(fpj (o)) > 0.
This construction can be repeated a finite number of times for each p ∈ P.
Specifically, for any σ ∈ P|P|, the transformation Fσ(o) ∈ Ext (Core(N, c)).
Corollary 3.6 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ with E = {i}, and (N, c) be the corresponding
PI-game. The Owen point is always an extreme point.
Proof. Take yk, zk ≥ ok for all k ∈ N , therefore o = z = y and o ∈
Ext (Core(N, c)) .
At this point we know that PI-games with a single essential player have, at
least, |P| + 1 extreme points. Next example shows that the core of a PI-game,
in general, cannot be explicitly described in polynomial time.
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Example 3.7 Now we consider a PI-situation with n periods and n players:
Demand Production Inventory Backlogging
P1 1 1 . . . 1 1n
1
n . . .
1
n 2 2 . . . 2 2 2 . . . 2
P2 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 2 2 . . . 2 2 2 . . . 2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
Pn 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 2 2 . . . 2 2 2 . . . 2
The corresponding PI-game is given by c(S) =
n∑
t=1
pSt d
S
t , for all S ⊆ N .
Moreover, it is easy to see that E = {1} and F1 = {2, 3, ..., n}. Then, we can
rewrite the characteristic function as follows:
c(S) =


|S| if 1 ∈ S,
n · |S| if 1 /∈ S.
In this example, the Owen point is o = (1, 1, ..., 1). For all i ∈ F1,
α(1,i)(o) = min
R∈∆(1,i)
{c(R)− oR} = min
R∈∆(1,i)
{n · |R| − |R|} = n− 1
then
f(1,i)(o) = (2− n, 1, ..., 1, n︸︷︷︸
i
, 1, ..., 1).
For all k 6= i, k ∈ F1,
α(1,k)(f(1,i)(o)) = min
R∈∆(1,k)
{c(R)−
∑
j∈R
(
f(1,i)(o)
)
j
}
= min
R∈∆(1,k)
{n · |R| − |R|︸ ︷︷ ︸
if i/∈R
, (n− 1) · |R| − n+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
if i∈R
} = n− 1,
then
f(1,k)
(
f(1,i)(o)
)
= (3− 2n, 1, ..., 1, n︸︷︷︸
i
, 1, ..., 1, n︸︷︷︸
k
, 1, ..., 1).
Hence, we have as many extreme points as possible ways to place ”n” and
”1” in n−1 positions; i.e. in this example the core has 2n−1+1 extreme points.
Therefore, we can conclude that the cardinality of the extreme points is
exponential in the number of players. Hence, we cannot explicitly describe the
core of a PI-game in polynomial time.
We propose below an alternative core allocation to the Owen point that
recognizes the role played by essential players on reducing the cost of their fans.
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4 Omega point
Guardiola et al. (2009) proposed the Owen point as a natural core allocation
for PI-games that arises when focusing on shadow prices of each period that
each player must pay to meet their demand in that period. It makes it possible
for all players in the joint venture to operate at minimum cost. If there is no
essential player, the Owen point is the unique core allocation. However, for
those PI-situations with at least one essential player, the Owen point reveals
the altruistic character of them because of it does not take into account the role
that these essential players play in reducing the cost of their fans. As the core of
the PI-games with essential players is large, we are looking for a core allocation
that motivates the essential players to continue in the join venture obtaining a
reduction in their demand costs in each period.
Let (N,D,ℜ) be a PI-situation with D being an integer matrix ((N,D,ℜ) ∈
Υ), and E 6= ∅. Remember that for all i ∈ E , there is a period t∗ ∈ {1, ..., T } such
that y∗t∗(N\{i}) > y
∗
t∗(N) and there also exists at least one player j ∈ N\{i}
such that djt∗ > 0. We denote by E
t and F t the sets of essential players and fans
for every period t ∈ {1, ..., T }. We note in passing that E =
⋃
t∈T
Et.
First, we consider the marginal contribution of the shadow prices of a player
i to the grand coalition N , that is, y∗t (N\{i})− y
∗
t (N). We then define the cost
reduction that a player i ∈ N can produce in another player j ∈ N in a period
t as follows:
qt(i, j) :=
{
(y∗t (N\{i})− y
∗
t (N)) · d
j
t if i 6= j
0 if i = j
The reader may notice that qt(i, j) > 0 only if i ∈ E
t and j ∈ F t, otherwise
qt(i, j) = 0. That is to say that only essential players can reduce their fan costs in
a given period. Alternatively, the amount of the cost qt(i, j) can be interpreted
as the maximum cost increase that a fan j ∈ F t is able to assume, in a certain
period t, to incentivize the essential player i ∈ Et.
Next we define a new cost allocation rule, the Omega point, that considers
the maximum cost increase mentioned above.
Definition 4.1 (Omega point) Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the corre-
sponding PI-game. The Omega point ω ∈ Rn is defined as ωi =
∑T
t=1 ω
t
i for all
player i ∈ N, where for each period t = 1, . . . , T ,
ωti :=


y∗t (N)d
i
t +
Qti︷ ︸︸ ︷
qt(E
t, i)−
∑
j∈F t
qt(i, j) if |E
t| = 1
y∗t (N)d
i
t otherwise
The Omega point means that, in each of the periods with a single essential
player, i.e. without competition, this essential player gets a cost reduction from
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his fans. The amount Qti represents the cost reduction or increase, depending
on the sign, for player i ∈ N in the period t. Notice that Qti < 0, only if
i is an essential player, otherwise Qti ≥ 0. In addition, Q
t = (Qti)i∈N for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T }.
The reader may also note that ω = o+Q, where Q ∈ Rn with Qi =
∑T
t=1Q
t
i.
It is worth noting that Qi represents the marginal cost reduction or increase,
of player i to the rest players. Moreover,
∑
i∈N Qi = 0. In this setting, those
players with Qi < 0, would prefer the Omega point to the Owen point. On the
contrary, those players with Qi > 0 would like the Owen point more.
The following example illustrates the cost reduction that the Omega point
applies to essential players while increasing the cost of fans.
Example 4.2 In example 3.3 the Owen point is o = (25, 26, 13). Moreover,
E1 = {1}, F 1 = {2, 3}, E2 = E3 = ∅ . The cost reduction for the essential
player 1 from his fans 2 and 3 are:
q1(1, 2) = 8; q1(1, 3) = 6;
Therefore,
ω1 = o1 − q1(1, 2)− q1(1, 3) = 25− 8− 6 = 11
ω2 = o2 + q1(1, 2) = 34
ω3 = o3 + q1(1, 3) = 19
In this case ω = (11, 34, 19) = (25, 26, 13) + Q, with Q = (−14, 8, 6). It is
also a core-allocation. Note that player 1 obtains a cost reduction of 14 units,
while players 2 and 3 are increasing their costs by 8 and 6 units, respectively.
Here, the Omega point is a core-allocation that recognizes the essential role of
player 1 through a cost reduction assumed by his fans. Next we demonstrate
that this always holds for any PI-game.
Proposition 4.3 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the corresponding PI-game.
The Omega point is a core-allocation.
Proof. Consider any period t and a coalition S ⊆ N . If t does not
have essential players or has more than one, then ωtS =
∑
i∈S y
∗
t (N)d
i
t ≤∑
i∈S y
∗
t (S)d
i
t = y
∗
t (S)d
S
t .
Otherwise, suppose that player k is essential in the period t (Et = {k} ). we
distinguish two possibilities:
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• k ∈ S, then
ωtS = ω
t
k +
∑
i∈S∩F t
ωti +
∑
i∈S\F t
ωti = y
∗
t (N)d
k
t −
∑
j∈F t
qt(k, j)
+
∑
i∈S∩F t
(
y∗t (N)d
i
t + qt(k, i)
)
+
∑
i∈S\F t
y∗t (N)d
i
t
= y∗t (N)d
S
t +
∑
i∈S∩F t
qt(k, i)−
∑
j∈F t
qt(k, j)
= y∗t (N)d
S
t −
∑
j∈F t\S
qt(k, j) ≤ y
∗
t (N)d
S
t ≤ y
∗
t (S)d
S
t
• k /∈ S, then
ωtS =
∑
i∈S∩F t
ωti +
∑
i∈S\F t
ωti =
∑
i∈S∩F t
(
y∗t (N)d
i
t + qt(k, i)
)
+
∑
i∈S\F t
y∗t (N)d
i
t
= y∗t (N)d
S
t +
∑
i∈S∩F t
(y∗t (N\{k})− y
∗
t (N)) d
i
t
=
∑
i∈S\F t
y∗t (N)d
i
t +
∑
i∈S∩F t
y∗t (N\{k})d
i
t
≤
∑
i∈S
y∗t (N\{k})d
i
t ≤
∑
i∈S
y∗t (S)d
i
t = y
∗
t (S)d
S
t
Hence, ωtS ≤ y
∗
t (S)d
S
t for all t ∈ T . Then, ωS =
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈S ω
t
i =
∑T
t=1 ω
t
S ≤∑T
t=1 y
∗
t (S)d
S
t = c(S) for any coalition S ⊆ N . Moreover, ωN = oN+
∑
i∈N Qi =
oN = c(N). Therefore ω ∈ Core(N, c).
4.1 Characterization of the Omega point
To complete the study of the Omega point, we here propose an axiomatic char-
acterization based on a set of desirable properties that make it unique. In order
to do that, we denote by ϕ a generic allocation rule on Υ and consider the fol-
lowing properties, some of which have been used in the literature to axiomatize
alternative allocations:
(EF) Efficiency. For all x ∈ ϕ(N,D,ℜ) and for any PI-game (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ,
xN = c
(N,D,ℜ)(N).
(NE) Nonemptiness. For any PI-game (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ, ϕ(N,D,ℜ) 6= ∅.
(IBC) Inessential bounded cost. For any PI-game (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and for all
x ∈ ϕ(N,D,ℜ), if i is an inessential player for (N,D,ℜ), then xi ≤∑T
t=1 y
∗
t (N\E
t)dit
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(TI) Tyranny. For all (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and for all x ∈ ϕ(N,D,ℜ), if k is a single
essential player then xN\{k} = c
(N,D,ℜ)(N \ {k}).
(ACP) Additive combination of periods’ demands. For all (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and for
all x ∈ ϕ(N,D,ℜ), there exists (zt)t∈T ∈ (R
N )N such that x =
∑T
t=1 zt
and for all t ∈ T , zt ∈ ϕ(N,Dt,ℜ) if |E
t| ≤ 1 and zt = Owen(N,Dt,ℜ)
otherwise, where
Dt =
(
dip
)
i=1,...,n
p=1,...,T
, dip =
{
dip if t = p,
0 otherwise.
(3)
The first two properties were already used in Guardiola et al. (2008), among
many other papers, to characterize the Owen point solution, and they are also
important to our new characterization of the Omega point. Recall that Ef-
ficiency ensures that the total cost of any PI-situation is entirely allocated
among the players. Analogously, Nonemptiness guarantees that this allocation
rule always return a feasible allocation of the overall cost when applied to any
PI-situation. Inessential bounded cost imposes a maxim cost for every inessen-
tial player in situations which an essentials players has left. Tyranny implies
that a single essential player will assert all his power over the rest so that they
assume the maximum possible cost.
Finally, an allocation rule satisfies the property of Additivity combination of
periods’ demands if it is additive with respect to the demand of the periods that
has at most an essential player plus the Owen point of those periods with more
than one essential player. We emphasize that this additivity results from the
following relationship c(N,D,ℜ) =
∑T
t=1 c
(N,Dt,ℜ) for all (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ. Thus, we
are interested on allocation rules, for PI-situations, compatible with this form
of distribution of their demands.
First, we prove that the Omega point satisfies all the properties mentioned
above.
Proposition 4.4 The Omega point defined on the set Υ, satisfies EF, NE, IBC,
TI and ACP.
Proof. For any PI situation (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ we know by proposition 4.3 that
ω(N,D,ℜ) ∈ Core(N, c) by . Hence, the Omega point verifies the properties of
EF and NE. An inessential player satisfy IBC since if for all i ∈ N
ωi(N,D,ℜ) =
T∑
t=1
ωti(N,D,ℜ) =
T∑
t=1
ωi(N,Dt,ℜ)
=
∑
t∈T/|Et|=1
(
y∗t (N)d
i
t + qt(E
t, i)
)
+
∑
t∈T/|Et|6=1
y∗t (N)d
i
t
=
∑
t∈T/|Et|=1
y∗t (N\E
t)dit +
∑
t∈T/|Et|6=1
y∗t (N)d
i
t ≤
T∑
t=1
y∗t (N\E
t)dit
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if there is only one essential player k, then:
T∑
t=1
ωtN\{k} =
T∑
t=1

y∗t (N)dN\{k}t + ∑
j∈N\{k}
qt(k, i)


=
T∑
t=1

y∗t (N)dN\{k}t + ∑
j∈N\{k}
(y∗t (N\{k})− y
∗
t (N)) d
j
t


=
T∑
t=1
(
y∗t (N\{k})d
N\{k}
t
)
= c(N,D,ℜ)(N \ {k}).
Then satisfy TI. Finally, considering Dt as it was already defined in (3), we
obtain that
∑T
t=1Dt = D and
ω(N,D,ℜ) =
(
T∑
t=1
ωti(N,D,ℜ)
)
i∈N
=
T∑
t=1
(ωi(N,Dt,ℜ))i∈N
=
∑
t∈T/|Et|≤1
ωi(N,Dt,ℜ) +
∑
t∈T/|Et|≥2
Owen(N,Dt,ℜ)
Hence, the Omega point satisfies ACP.
Second, we focus on PI-situations without essential players and show that,
in this setting, the Omega point matches the Owen point, and both can be
characterized by using only three of the previous properties.
Proposition 4.5 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ be a PI situation with |E| = 0. Then,
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) = ω(N,D,ℜ) = Owen(N,D,ℜ) if and only if ϕ satisfies NE, EF
and IBC.
Proof. (If) Immediately follows by Proposition 4.4.
(Only if) By NE, ϕ(N,D,ℜ) 6= ∅. Take x ∈ ϕ(N,D,ℜ). Since all players i ∈ N
are inessential, by IBC, it holds that xi ≤
∑T
t=1 y
∗
t (N\E
t)dit =
∑T
t=1 y
∗
t (N)d
i
t =
ωi(N,D,ℜ) for each i ∈ N . Therefor,e by EF, ϕ(N,D,ℜ) = ω(N,D,ℜ) =
Owen(N,D,ℜ).
The main Theorem of this section shows that the Omega point is the unique
allocation rule that satisfies the aforementioned five properties.
Theorem 4.6 An allocation rule on (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ satisfies the properties EF,
NE, IBC, TI and ACP if and only if it coincides with the Omega point.
Proof. (If) The if part of the proof is direct from Proposition 4.4.
(Only if) Let ϕ be an allocation rule. The case where the number of essential
players is zero, namely |E| = 0, follows from Proposition 4.5. Then, it remains
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to prove the case when |E| ≥ 1.In this case, we know that D = D1+D2+...+DT
where Dt is (see (3)):
Dt =


0 . . . 0 d1t 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 d2t 0 . . . 0
... . . . 0
... 0 . . .
...
0 . . . 0 dnt 0 . . . 0

 .
Then for all t ∈ T , (N,Dt,ℜ) is a PI-situation with Dt an integer matrix. This
implies that (N,Dt,ℜ) belongs to Υ. Therefore, for any t ∈ T, the Omega point
for (N,Dt,ℜ) is (ωi(N,Dt,ℜ))i=1,...,n:
By NE, ϕ(N,Dt,ℜ) 6= ∅. for each situation (N,Dt,ℜ) we have two cases:
• |Et| = 0, then by Proposition 4.5 ϕ(N,Dt,ℜ) = ω(N,Dt,ℜ) = Owen(N,Dt,ℜ).
• Et = {k}. Take u ∈ ϕ(N,Dt,ℜ), by IBC ui ≤ y
∗
t (N\{k})d
i
t for all i ∈
N\{k} and by TY uN\{k} = y
∗
t (N\{k})d
N\{k}
t . Hence for all i ∈ N\{k}
ui = y
∗
t (N\{k})d
i
t = y
∗
t (N)d
i
t + qt(E
t, i) = ωi(N,Dt,ℜ). Finally, by EF
uk = c(N) − c(N\{k}) = y
∗
t (N)d
N
t − y
∗
t (N\{k})d
N\{k}
t = y
∗
t (N)d
k
t −
(y∗t (N\{k})− y
∗
t (N)) d
N\{k}
t = y
∗
t (N)d
k
t −
∑
j∈F t qt(k, j) = ωk(N,Dt,ℜ).
Therefore, if x ∈ ϕ(N,D,ℜ) by ACP one has that x = z1 + ... + zt with
zt ∈ ϕ(N,Dt,ℜ) for all t ∈ T , and so
x =
T∑
t=1
zt =
∑
t∈T/|Et|≤1
ω(N,Dt,ℜ) +
∑
t∈T/|Et|≥2
Owen(N,Dt,ℜ) = ω(N,D,ℜ).
The above equation implies that ϕ(N,D,ℜ) = ω(N,D,ℜ).
Finally, we prove that all the properties used in Theorem 4.6 are logically
independent. That is, the characterization of the Omega point is tight in the
sense that no property is redundant.
Example 4.7 Let ϕ be a solution rule defined on Υ as
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) :=


(
c(N,D,ℜ)(N)
2 ,
c(N,D,ℜ)(N)
2
)
, (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ1
ω(N,D,ℜ), otherwise,
where
Υ1 :=
{
(N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ
/
|N | = 2, T = 2, E1 = {1, 2}, E2 = ∅
}
.
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) satisfies EF, NE, IBC and TI, but not ACP.
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Example 4.8 Let ϕ be a solution rule defined on Υ as
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) :=


(
c(N,D,ℜ)(N), 0
)
, (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ2
ω(N,D,ℜ), otherwise,
where
Υ2 := {(N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ/|N | = 2, T = 1, E = ∅ } .
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) satisfies EF, NE, ACP and TI, but not IBC.
Example 4.9 Let ϕ be a solution rule defined on Υ as
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) := Owen(N,D,ℜ)
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) satisfies EF, NE, IBC, and ACP, but not TI.
Example 4.10 Let ϕ be a solution rule defined on Υ as
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) :=


(
c(N,D,ℜ)(N \ {E1}), c(N,D,ℜ)(N \ {E1})
)
, (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ3
ω(N,D,ℜ), otherwise,
,
where
Υ3 :=
{
(N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ
/
|N | = 2, T = 1,
∣∣E1∣∣ = 1 } .
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) satisfies NE, IBC, TI and ACP, but not EF.
Example 4.11 Let ϕ be a solution rule defined on Υ as
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) := ∅.
ϕ(N,D,ℜ) satisfies EF, ACP, IBC, and TI. but not NE.
5 Quid Pro Quo allocations
As we already mentioned, the Omega point can be considered the natural as-
piration of the essential players to achieve the biggest cost reduction while the
Owen point reflects their altruistic character. We combine both extreme charac-
teristics and define the λ-agreement a(λ) := λω+(1− λ) o with λ ∈ [0, 1] , as the
convex linear combination of the Owen point and the Omega point. The param-
eter λ represents here the weight given to individual behavior, by those players
who want to maximize their cost reduction, compared to altruistic behavior (by
1− λ), which benefits the other players.
The set of all the above agreements is called Quid Pro Quo allocation set.
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Definition 5.1 (Quid Pro Quo allocation set) Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c)
be the corresponding PI-game. We define the Quid pro quo allocation set as fol-
lows:
QPQ(N, c) := {a(λ) such that λ ∈ [0, 1]} .
The Quid Pro Quo allocation set, henceforth QPQ-set, is a parametric family
of core-allocations. That is, QPQ(N, c) ⊆ Core(N, c).
The following example illustrate the wealth of the QPQ set of a PI-situation
with multiple essential players.
Example 5.2 Let us consider a PI-situation with four players in four peri-
ods with demand, and production, inventory and backlogging costs given in the
following table:
Demand Production Inventory Backlogging
P1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
P2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
P3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
P4 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
The above table described a cooperative game with a characteristic function de-
tailed in the following table:
dS1 d
S
2 d
S
3 d
S
4 p
S
1 p
S
2 p
S
3 p
S
4 h
S
1 h
S
2 h
S
3 b
S
1 b
S
2 b
S
3 c
{1} 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 12
{2} 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 12
{3} 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 12
{4} 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 10
{1, 2} 4 3 3 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 21
{1, 3} 4 2 4 4 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 20
{1, 4} 4 2 3 4 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 18
{2, 3} 4 3 3 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 22
{2, 4} 4 3 2 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 19
{3, 4} 4 2 3 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 19
{1, 2, 3} 6 4 5 6 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 27
{1, 2, 4} 6 4 5 6 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 24
{1, 3, 4} 6 3 5 6 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 23
{2, 3, 4} 6 4 4 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 26
{1, 2, 3, 4} 8 5 6 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 27
Here, y∗(N) = (1, 1, 1, 1) and the Owen point is o = (7, 7, 7, 6). Moreover,
E = N, because of each player is essential just in one period. For example in
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period 1, E1 = {1} and F 1 = {2, 3, 4}. In addition, q1(1, j) = 2 for j ∈ F
1,
Q1 = (−6, 2, 2, 2), Q2 = (1,−3, 1, 1), Q3 = (2, 1,−4, 1) and Q4 = (2, 2, 2,−6).
It is easy to check that Q = (−1, 2, 1,−2) that is, players 1 and 4 are in-
terested in improving the Owen point, and they would prefer the Omega point.
However, players 2 and 3, still being essential, get some benefit with the Owen
point’s and they would prefer to keep on it.
On the other hand, here the omega point is ω = (6, 9, 8, 4) and the QPQ set
is given by:
QPQ(N, c) := {(7− λ, 7 + 2λ, 7 + λ, 6 − 2λ) such that λ ∈ [0, 1]}
If we consider the same weight for both individual and altruistic behaviors,
we get the Shapley, which also matches the Nucleolus. That is, for λ = 12 the
Shapley value and Nucleolus coincides and both are equal to
(
13
2 , 8,
15
2 , 5
)
.
At this point we wonder whether this coincidence always holds for every
PI-game. The answer is no, in general, as example 5.5 reveals.
The main result of this section shows that, if no player can get a cost re-
duction in any coalition without an essential player, then the equal agreement,
a
(
1
2
)
, coincides with the Shapley value and the Nucleolus. In some sense, it is
a Solomonic agreement between the players who demand cost reductions (in-
dividual behaviour) and those who do not (altruistic behaviour). For that, we
call a
(
1
2
)
Solomonic allocation and denote it ς(N, c).
Proposition 5.3 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the corresponding PI-game.
Assume that for each t = 1, . . . , T the following conditions are simultaneously
fulfilled:
(i) |Et| ≤ 1,
(ii) y∗t (E
t) = y∗t (N) if E
t 6= φ,
(iii) y∗t (N\E
t) = y∗t ({i}) for all i ∈ N\E
t.
Then, ς(N, c) = φ(N, c) = η(N, c).
Proof. Consider (N,Dt,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c
t) be the corresponding PI-game,
with, (only period t has demand)
Dt =
(
dip
)
i=1,...,n
p=1,...,T
, dip =
{
dip if t = p,
0 otherwise.
We will denote to simplify notation o(N,Dt,ℜ) and ω(N,Dt,ℜ) as o
t and
ωt, respectively. By (i) we consider only two cases:
• If |Et| = 0 then ωt = ot = Core(N, ct) = η(N, ct) since the Nucleolus
always belongs to the core of a game. Moreover, because of the condition
(iii) y∗t (N) = y
∗
t ({i}) for all i ∈ N, then c
t(S) = otS for all S ⊆ N, It is
easy to verify that all players are dummy players then φ(N, ct) = ot.
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• If |Et| = 1, (Et = {k}).
Note that if k ∈ S then ct(S ∪ {i})− ct(S) = y∗t (N)d
i
t, otherwise (k /∈ S)
then by condition (iii) ct(S∪{i})− ct(S) = y∗t (S∪{i})d
S∪{i}
t −y
∗
t (S)d
S
t =
y∗t (N\E
t)dit for all i ∈ N\E
t.
If i ∈ N\Et then,
φi(N, c
t) =
∑
S⊆N{i}
γ(S) ·
[
ct(S ∪ {i})− ct(S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N{i}/k∈S
γ(S) ·
[
ct(S ∪ {i})− ct(S)
]
+
∑
S⊆N{i}/k/∈S
γ(S) ·
[
ct(S ∪ {i})− ct(S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N{i}/k∈S
γ(S) · y∗t (N)d
i
t +
∑
S⊆N{i}/k/∈S
γ(S) · y∗t (N\E
t)dit
= y∗t (N)d
i
t ·

 ∑
S⊆N{i}/k∈S
γ(S)


+y∗t (N\E
t)dit ·

 ∑
S⊆N{i}/k/∈S
γ(S)


=
1
2
· y∗t (N)d
i
t +
1
2
· y∗t (N\E
t)dit
=
1
2
· y∗t (N)d
i
t +
1
2
·
(
y∗t (N)d
i
t +
(
y∗t (N\{E
t})− y∗t (N)
)
· dit
)
=
1
2
· oti +
1
2
· ωti
By efficiency of Shapley value φEt(N, c
t) = 12 · o
t
Et +
1
2 · ω
t
Et . Moreover,
Shapley value satisfies additivity property, thus for all player i ∈ N
φi(N, c) =
T∑
t=1
φi(N, c
t) =
T∑
t=1
(
1
2
· oti +
1
2
· ωti
)
=
1
2
·
T∑
t=1
oti +
1
2
·
T∑
t=1
ωti
=
1
2
· oi(N,D,ℜ) +
1
2
· ωi(N,D,ℜ)
since the Owen point is additive for the demands (demonstrated in Guardi-
ola et al. (2008)) and ωi(N,Dt,ℜ) = ω
t
i(N,D,ℜ). Hence, ς(N, c) =
φ(N, c).
Now, we will prove that the Shapley value coincides with the Nucleolus.
As we have seen previously if the properties (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied
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for a period t = 1, . . . , T and for each i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ N \ {i}
∆ti(S) := c
t(S∪{i})−ct(S) =


y∗t (N)d
i
t if E
t ∈ S and i /∈ Et
y∗t (N\E
t)dit if E
t /∈ S and i /∈ Et
y∗t (N)d
i
t − y
∗
t (N\E
t)dit if i ∈ E
t
similarly we get that
∆ti(N \ (S ∪ {i})) =


y∗t (N\E
t)dit if E
t ∈ S and i /∈ Et
y∗t (N)d
i
t if E
t /∈ S and i /∈ Et
y∗t (N)d
i
t − y
∗
t (N\E
t)dit if i ∈ E
t
Hence, ∆ti(S)+∆
t
i(N \(S ∪ {i})) = y
∗
t (N)d
i
t+y
∗
t (N\E
t)dit if i ∈ N\E
t for
all S ⊆ N\{i} and ∆ti(S)+∆
t
i(N\(S ∪ {i})) = 2·
(
y∗t (N)d
i
t − y
∗
t (N\E
t)dit
)
if i ∈ Et for all S ⊆ N \ Et. We consider ∆i(S) :=
∑T
t=1∆
t
i(S) for each
i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. Thus ∆i(S) + ∆i(N \ (S ∪ {i})) is a
constant for all S ⊆ N \ {i} and for all i ∈ N . Then (N, c) is a PS-game
and ς(N, c) = φ(N, c) = η(N, c).
The reader may notice that for those situations in which the properties (i),
(ii) and (iii) hold and, in addition, Q = 0 (i.e., o = ω), then QPQ(N, c) =
{o(N,D,ℜ)} = {φ(N, c)} = {η(N, c)}. Otherwise, the core is larger.
Finally, we analyze the relationships between conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and
concavity of PI-games.
Proposition 5.4 Let (N,D,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c) be the corresponding PI-game.
If for each t = 1, . . . , T conditions (i), (ii) and (ii) are fulfilled simultaneously
the (N, c) is concave.
Proof. Consider (N,Dt,ℜ) ∈ Υ and (N, c
t) be the corresponding PI-game,
(a) If |Et| = 0 then y∗t ({i}) = y
∗
t (N) for all i ∈ N henceforth c
t(S) − ct(S \
{i}) = y∗t (N)d
i
t for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ N. Hence (N, c
t) is concave.
(b) If |Et| = 1, let say Et = {k}. Then two cases can be distinguished:
(b1) k ∈ S ⊆ T ⊂ N then ct(S) − ct(S \ {i}) = y∗t (N)d
i
t = c
t(T )− ct(T \ {i})
for all i ∈ N \ {k}. Finally
ct(S)− ct(S \ {k}) ≥ ct(T )− ct(T \ {k});
y∗t (N)d
S
t − y
∗
t (N \ {k})d
S\{k}
t ≥ y
∗
t (N)d
T
t − y
∗
t (N \ {k})d
T\{k}
t ;
y∗t (N \ {k})d
T\S
t ≥ y
∗
t (N)d
T\S
t .
It is true since y∗t (S) ≥ y
∗
t (R) for all S ⊆ R ⊆ N and all t ∈ {1, ..., T }.
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(b2) k /∈ S and k ∈ T. By condition (iii) ct(S)− ct(S \ {i}) = y∗t (N \ {k})d
i
t ≥
ct(T )− ct(T \ {i}) since if k ∈ T is satisfied ct(T )− ct(T \ {i}) = y∗t (N)d
i
t
and if k /∈ T we have that ct(T )− ct(T \ {i}) = y∗t (N \ {k})d
i
t.
Finally, by additivity property of PI-games with respect to periods (see Guardi-
ola et al. (2008)) (N, c) is concave.
Next example shows that conditions (i), (ii), (iii), although necessaries, are
no sufficient for concavity.
Example 5.5 Let us consider a PI-situation with three players in three peri-
ods with demand, and production, inventory and backlogging costs given in the
following table:
Demand Production Inventory Backlogging
P1 10 10 10 1 2 3 1 2 1 1
P2 10 10 10 2 1 3 1 2 1 1
P3 10 10 10 3 3 1 1 2 2 2
Using those data one can obtain the cooperative game with characteristic
function described below:
dS1 d
S
2 d
S
3 p
S
1 p
S
2 p
S
3 h
S
1 h
S
2 b
S
1 b
S
2 c
{1} 10 10 5 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 45
{2} 10 10 10 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 50
{3} 10 10 10 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 70
{1, 2} 20 20 15 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 70
{1, 3} 20 20 15 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 75
{2, 3} 20 20 20 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 80
{1, 2, 3} 30 30 25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 85
It is easy to check that the above game is concave, but condition (iii) does not
hold. Indeed, for the first period, E1 = {1} but y∗1({2, 3}) = 2 < 3 = y
∗
1({3}).
Moreover, the Nucleolus η(N, c) =
(
70
3 ,
85
3 ,
100
3
)
is lightly different from the
Shapley value, φ(N, c) =
(
125
6 ,
155
6 ,
115
3
)
.
Finally, o = (30, 30, 25), ω = (25, 30, 30) and so the Solomonic allocation is
ς(N, c) =
(
55
2 , 30,
55
2
)
.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper completes the study of the PI-games presented in Guardiola et al.
(2008, 2009). Those two papers proposed the Owen point as a natural core-
allocation, which does not pay attention to the role that essential players play
in reducing the costs of their fans. In that sense, essential players could consider
the Owen point as an altruistic core-allocation. However, the core was not
studied in depth there.
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Here we have analyzed carefully the core structure of PI-games, and we
have realized that the number of extreme point of its core is exponential in the
number of players. Then, we have proposed a new core-allocation, the Omega
point, that compensates the essential players for their role in reducing the costs
of their fans. Based on the Owen and Omega points we have defined the QPQ-
set. Since every QPQ allocation is a convex combination of the Owen and the
Omega points, we have paid special attention to the equally weighted QPQ
allocation, the Solomonic allocation. Finally, we have provided some necessary
conditions for the coincidence of the latter with the Shapley value and the
Nucleolus.
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